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Abstract
Plans for European Monetary Union are based on the conventional postulate that
increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real
economic effects. However, the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on
models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit
institutional variables other than the central bank. When the signaling problems
between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered,
we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank
independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more
or less effective. Greater independence can reduce inflation without major
employment effects where bargaining is coordinated, but it brings higher levels of
unemployment where bargaining is uncoordinated. Thus, currency unions like the
EMU may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their
proponents envisage; they will have costs as well as benefits, costs which will be
distributed unevenly among and within the member nations based on the changes
induced in the status of the bank and of wage coordination.
Zusammenfassung
Die Konzepte für die Europäische Währungsunion basieren auf dem allgemein
vertretenen Postulat, daß mit größerer Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank die Inflation
ohne reale ökonomische Effekte verringert werden kann. Allerdings beruht die
theoretische wie empirische Basis für diesen Anspruch auf Modellvorstellungen einer
Volkswirtschaft, die auf unrealistischen Annahmen der Bedeutung von Informationen
beruhen und institutionelle Variable - mit Ausnahme der Zentralbank - außer acht
lassen. Wird allerdings die wechselseitige Wahrnehmung und Interpretation von
Informationen („signaling problems“) zwischen Zentralbank und den anderen
Akteuren in der politischen Ökonomie in die Analyse einbezogen, dann  ist
festzustellen, daß die Art der Lohnfindung die Intensität der Auswirkungen der
Zentralbankunabhängigkeit beeinflußt je nachdem, wie wirksam die wechselseitige
Wahrnehmung und Interpretation von Informationen zwischen der Zentralbank und
den Tarifpartnern vermittelt ist.
Im Falle koordinierter Tarifverhandlungen kann eine größere Unabhängigkeit der
Zentralbank die Inflation in der Tat ohne größere Beschäftigungseffekte vermindern,
im Falle unkoordinierter Tarifverhandlungen führt dies allerdings zu einem höheren
Niveau der Arbeitslosigkeit. Daraus leitet sich die Überlegung ab, daß eine
Währungsunion vom Typ „Europäische Währungsunion“ ein höheres Maß an
Arbeitslosigkeit erfordert, um die Inflation unter Kontrolle zu halten, als es ihre
Befürworter erwarten. Bei den sich dann einstellenden Vor- und Nachteilen werden
die Nachteile zwischen und innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten ungleich verteilt sein,
abhängig von dem letztendlich verwirklichten Grad der Unabhängigkeit der
Zentralbank und der Form der Lohnfindung.
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1Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage-
Bargaining, and European Monetary Union
The European Union provides the most developed case in the post-war world of
economic and political integration among nation-states. Some forty years after
its founding, the EU is planning to take a major step toward further integration
by constructing a monetary union that will provide some of its members with a
common currency administered by a new European central bank. Although
there has been debate about the advantages of such an enterprise and
especially about the costs incurred in transition to it, there is widespread
agreement among the governing elites of Europe that European Monetary
Union (EMU) is a desirable objective.i
Intrinsic to their view is the understanding that the new Union will be
managed by a central bank that is considerably independent of political control.ii
Current expectations about the operation and benefits of EMU are partially
based on a set of contentions about the advantages of central bank
independence that have become widely-accepted among economists and
policy-makers. As one influential financial publication concluded: “The
argument for central bank independence…appears overwhelming.”iii If these
contentions are accurate, EMU may function well and in time become a model
toward which other free-trade regimes aspire. Inter alia, this would reinforce a
world-wide widespread trend toward the transfer of functions once seen as
important attributes of political authority to supranational agencies that are
relatively insulated from political control.iv
The object of this article is to question several features of the consensus
that has emerged in favor of independent central banks and to present a new
perspective on the economic performance that can be expected from European
Monetary Union.v We focus on three issues. How should the way in which the
actions of the central bank affect the economy be conceptualized? Do higher
levels of central bank independence invariably result in better economic
performance? Will the creation of a European Monetary Union equipped with
such a bank improve economic well-being in its member states? If the analysis
we present is correct, the economic performance secured under EMU may well
disappoint many of its proponents; pressure can be expected to arise for
renegotiation of its arrangements; and the general usefulness of currency
unions to free-trade areas may have to be reassessed.
We proceed by reexamining each of three pillars on which the case for an
independent central bank rests. The first is a body of economic theory that
explains why the independence of the central bank should enhance economic
performance.vi The second is a critical case, that of the Federal Republic of
Germany, whose Bundesbank provides the model for the new European central
bank in large measure because its independence has been deemed central to
2Germany’s historic ability to secure low rates of inflation.vii The third is an
influential set of empirical studies which appear to substantiate the proposition
that, by making the central bank more independent, a nation can secure lower
rates of inflation without any adverse economic effects by making its central
bank more independent.viii
Our analysis is driven by the contention that most existing analyses of
central bank independence fail to specify properly the way in which central
banks operate on the economy because they make unrealistic assumptions
about the information available to the key actors and neglect other institutional
features of the political economy. In that respect, this article is an effort to bring
the insights of comparative political economy to bear on an issue that is often
treated in more narrow economic terms. It can be read as a critique of the
central bank independence literature, as a reevaluation of the consequences of
European Monetary Union, and as an argument about the importance of
institutional interaction within political economies.
II. Theories of Central Bank Independence
A standard neoclassical model underpins most of the literature on central bank
independence. It assumes that the rate of inflation is determined primarily by
the rate of growth of the money supply, which is controlled by the central bank,
while the rate of unemployment is affected by the level of real wages and
unanticipated changes in policy.ix Within this framework, a variety of theories
currently attribute advantages to central bank independence. Some argue that
an independent central bank can stimulate the economy more effectively
because economic actors are less likely to anticipate monetary expansion from
it than they would from a central bank more dependent on politicians.x Others
argue that central bank independence may reduce the political business cycles
that result from pre-electoral manipulation of monetary policy or post-electoral
partisan shocks.xi However, the claim on which we focus here is the one most
frequently cited in favor of central bank independence, namely the one that
derives from the time-inconsistency problem associated with monetary policy in
the context of nominal-wage contracting.
This theory specifies that, given nominal wages and/or prices which must
be fixed for some duration before monetary policy is set, uncertainty about the
future stance of monetary policy (and hence the rate of inflation) will lead
contractors to agree on higher nominal wages and prices than they desire in
order to guard against the possibility that future inflation will lower real wages
and returns. As a result, wage/price settlements will be more inflationary than
might otherwise be the case. Although the central bank can offer assurances
that it will refrain from generating such inflation, the credibility of those
assurances will be undermined to the degree the bank is responsible to
politicians who are known to be sensitive to electoral pressures that might
incline them toward more expansionary policy. Thus, rendering the central bank
more independent of political control will increase the credibility of its
assurances that monetary policy will remain tight, thereby allowing wage/price
3bargainers to lower their nominal contracts by reducing their fears about the
real-wage and real-return losses that would be generated by unanticipated
inflation. The result will be a lower rate of inflation without any adverse effects
on the real economy.xii
This theory is now one of the most widely-accepted in economics.
However, it has both strengths and weaknesses that can best be appreciated
by seeing the central issues here as those of signaling and coordination. In
short, this is a theory about the effectiveness of the process whereby signals
transmitted from the central bank lead economic actors to coordinate on
Pareto-superior forms of equilibrium behavior. The independence of the central
bank matters primarily because it alters (i) the content of the signals that the
bank sends about the course of monetary policy (a ‘conservatism effect’) and
(ii) the credibility of those signals (a ‘credibility effect’).xiii If credible signals are
sent from the bank and the relevant economic actors are able to coordinate
their behavior in light of them, nominal wage/price settlements will be lower
than they would otherwise be and the bank can pursue the monetary policy it
has announced without dampening the economy. On the other hand, if these
signals do not inspire appropriate wage/price behavior, either because they lack
credibility or because the relevant actors cannot coordinate on appropriate
behavior, the monetary policy announced by the bank will occur in a context of
relatively excessive nominal wages and prices, thereby dampening the
economy and generating unemployment. Therefore, the conventional theory of
central bank independence has the great merit of drawing our attention, first, to
the importance of signaling in central bank behavior, second, to the importance
of the credibility of those signals and, third, to the significance of independence
for such credibility.
However, the model of signaling and coordination underpinning this theory
is deficient in some other important respects. In general, it models the process
of signaling as a highly diffuse one in which the central bank’s announcement
of a monetary rule will by itself lead a vast number of actors in the economy to
modify their wage/price settlements. This is based on standard rational-
expectations assumptions that each actor will be able to predict the effects of
an announced monetary policy on the economy, the behavior of all other
relevant actors in the face of such an announcement, and the effects of that
behavior. Under these conditions, rationality alone leads actors to coordinate
their behavior on the optimal equilibrium. But such a model may not be
appropriate for many of the cases it is meant to cover. It suffers from two
problems. First, it assumes that the actors have unrealistically-high levels of
prescience and information. As Eichengreen has observed in another context,
the effects of monetary policy are often the subject of considerable
disagreement even among experts.xiv When there are many wage and price
bargainersxv in the economy, it is highly unlikely that they will all be able to
predict the multiple effects of monetary policy with precision, let alone predict
the behavior that will follow from the predictions made by other actors. Second,
this approach assumes away the collective-action problems often present when
the behavior of a large number of actors, facing some uncertainty about the
behavior of others, must be coordinated. Such problems are well-known to be
endemic to wage bargaining in particular.xvi In the circumstances of most
4industrial economies, we think it more realistic to posit actors (a) with
bargaining power so that they must condition their wage and price settlements
on expected settlements elsewhere but (b) with less-than-complete information
about the effects of monetary policy and/or other’s reactions to it. This means
that there will be substantial collective-action problems associated with securing
coordination on a Pareto-optimal equilibrium, which rationality alone will not
address. In such circumstances, the achievement of an effective signaling and
coordination process will depend more heavily on the presence of an
appropriate set of institutional arrangements of the sort to which the ‘new
political economy’ draws our attention, i.e. institutions that provide the actors
with a basis for making credible commitments, monitoring the behavior of each
other, and the like.xvii From this perspective, the problem with most conventional
analyses of central bank independence is that, by considering the
characteristics of only one institution, i.e. the central bank, they fail to
appreciate the role that other institutions might play in the overall signaling and
coordination process.
In this article, we seek, first, to render the analysis of central bank
independence more realistic by assuming actors with less-than-complete
information about the effects of monetary policy and the behavior of other
actors and, second, to broaden the analysis by including other institutions
relevant to this signaling and coordination process. We focus, in particular, on
the institutions associated with wage bargaining.xviii
III. The Role of Coordinated Wage Bargaining
Our choice of variables is not coincidental. A substantial literature in
comparative political economy suggests that the institutional variables
associated with wage bargaining can have large effects on economic
performance.xix To date, scholars seeking institutional explanations for the rate
of inflation have been confronted with two separate literatures that deserve to
be integrated, one emphasizing central bank independence and the other wage
bargaining.
We focus here on the coordination of wage bargaining, a phrase that refers
to the degree to which the determination of wage settlements is actively
coordinated across the economy by trade-union and/or employer organizations.
That, in turn, depends heavily on the organizational structures for wage
bargaining, which vary from country to country. The full set of institutional
arrangements required for coordinated wage-bargaining are complex because
they must support cooperative outcomes in five nested sets of strategic
interactions.xx The first is the interaction that takes place within each dyad of
bargainers between the organizations representing workers and those
representing employers. A second takes place between the leaders of
bargaining organizations and the rank and file members whose support they
must retain. We focus here on the interaction between the bargainers in each
dyad and their counterparts in other dyads and on the interaction between
5wage bargainers as a group and the authorities controlling economic policy. A
fifth interaction occurs between the authorities controlling monetary policy and
those controlling fiscal policy.
With regard to the interactions examined here, an early literature
associated wage coordination entirely with highly centralized trade-union
movements bargaining with employer confederations at the peak level. In
recent years, however, two important amendments have been made to this
view. First, it has been shown that employers’ organizations can play an equally
important role in the coordination of wage bargaining.xxi Second, it has been
noted that effective coordination can take place within either of two
organizational structures. In one, the principal locus of bargaining is at the
economy-wide level, where negotiations occur among highly centralized trade-
union and employers confederations. In the other, wage negotiation takes place
primarily among trade unions and employer organizations highly concentrated
at the sectoral level but equipped with sufficient economy-wide linkages to
transmit the settlement reached in a leading sector across the economy.xxii
To appreciate the impact of wage coordination on the economy, consider
initially the case in which bargaining is not coordinated but conducted by many
units acting separately. In this setting, each bargaining unit, generally a dyad of
employer and union, must reach a settlement in the context of considerable
uncertainty about what the settlements reached by other bargaining units will
be. This is conducive to three behavioral consequences.
First, the union in each dyad will be tempted to seek an extra “inflation
increment” on top of the real wages it desires in order to protect itself from the
real-wage losses it will incur if other settlements are more inflationary than its
own. Because employers can expect such inflation to erode any nominal-wage
concessions they make, they will also be more likely to accede to high
settlements. Second, the actors in any one bargaining unit are unlikely to let
considerations about the effects of their settlement on the overall economy
influence their decision-making because any one bargaining unit is normally too
small to have a noticeable impact of its own on the economy. TheirThis posture
will be reinforced by the fact that other bargaining units can be expected to take
a similar view; such that, if one union moderates its nominal-wage settlement in
the national economic interest, it may suffer real-wage losses from the failure of
other units to do so.xxiii Third, when the economy-wide level of wage settlements
proves inflationary, the fiscal or monetary authorities may respond with
deflationary policies. In an uncoordinated setting, however, the actors in any
one bargaining units are unlikely to let the prospect of such a response
influence their own settlement very much because they know that the monetary
authority will be producing a policy, not in response to it, but to settlements
across the economy as a whole, which they cannot control. Thus, in
uncoordinated settings, wage bargainers are unlikely to be highly responsive to
threats from the fiscal or monetary authorities to respond to inflationary
settlements with deflation.
6Compare now the case in which wage bargaining is coordinated. In such
settings, a central or lead bargain has great influence over the level of wage
settlements in the economy as a whole. Several implications follow from this.
First, since the members of each bargaining unit, especially the lead unit, know
what the level of subsequent wage settlements is likely to be once they have
settled on their own, they need not build an increment for unanticipated inflation
arising from other higher settlements into their own agreement. Second,
because the lead bargaining unit knows that its settlement is likely to be
generalized to the whole economy, the actors within it have a strong incentive
to take the impact of their settlement on the economy into account when
negotiating it. Thus, we can expect their concerns about levels of inflation,
unemployment and national competitiveness to influence wage settlements
more strongly in coordinated systems of wage bargaining. An important
empirical hypothesis follows from these observations: where wage bargaining is
more coordinated, we should see lower rates of inflation, whether or not the
central bank is independent.
Most central to our argument, however, is the way in which the system of
wage bargaining interacts with the character of the central bank. Because the
lead settlement in a system of coordinated wage bargaining is likely to be
copied by other bargaining units, with direct effects for the entire economy,
those negotiating it know that the central bank is likely to respond directly to it.
This renders the principal wage-bargainers highly sensitive to signals from the
central bank about the appropriateness of pending wage settlements and the
likely stance of monetary policy in the face of them. In short, the signals sent
from the central bank are more likely to affect the level of wage settlements in
settings where wage bargaining is coordinated than in settings where it is not.
The important implication of this is that, where wage bargaining is
coordinated, the central bank may be able to influence the level of settlements
and reduce inflation simply by signaling its policy intentions so that monetary
policy does not raise the level of unemployment. Where wage bargaining is
uncoordinated, however, such that small bargaining units have no reason to
expect a direct response to their settlement and disincentives to exercise
general moderation lest others fail to do so, the central bank may have to apply
very tight monetary policies that induce substantial increases in unemployment
before wage and price contracts will respond.
In sum, we contend (i) that the effectiveness of the signaling and
coordination process that links the central bank and wage contractors is an
important determinant of national levels of inflation and unemployment and (ii)
that the character of the wage-bargaining system is intrinsic to the effectiveness
of this process. Increasing the independence of the central bank is likely to
reduce the rate of inflation in all systems through a combination of
‘conservatism’ and ‘credibility’ effects.xxiv However, this analysis suggests that
credibility effects, which allow an increase in the independence of the central
bank to reduce inflation without large increases in unemployment, are likely to
dominateoccur only where the signaling and coordination process is effective,
namely in systems where wage bargaining is coordinated. Where wage
bargaining is less coordinated, an increase in the independence of the central
7bank is likely to reduce inflation only at the cost of corresponding increases in
unemployment.
In the sections that follow, we use a cross-national empirical analysis to
test the validity of these propositions. First, however, we examine their
plausibility in a crucial national case, that of Germany.
IV. The German Model Reconsidered
The Federal Republic of Germany has long been one of the most prominent
cases adduced to support arguments for the economic effects of central bank
independence. Its Bundesbank is considered one of the most independent
central banks in the world and, for most of the postwar period, the German
economy has been able to achieve low rates of inflation at relatively low rates of
unemployment.xxv Thus, it is tempting to conclude, as many do, that the
principal factor accounting for this outstanding economic record is the
independence of the Bundesbank. This may have been one of the reasons why
the European Central Bank is to be modeled on the Bundesbank.xxvi
A closer examination of the German case, however, suggests that the
Bundesbank is not the only institutional feature of the German economy
contributing to the achievement of low inflation and unemployment.xxvii In what
follows, we argue that the institutional arrangements for wage bargaining have
also greatly enhanced the capacity of the German economy to attain low rates
of inflation at relatively low rates of unemployment.xxviii An examination of the
German case also allows us to explore in more detail the nature and operation
of institutional arrangements for coordinated wage-bargaining and how they
operate in conjunction with monetary policy, although these details will vary, of
course, to some extent from nation to nation.
We begin by outlining the principal institutions that underpin wage
bargaining. The German workforce is organized into 17 large unions, often
covering entire industries, which also belong to an overarching union
confederation, the DGB, (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund).xxix These unions
bargain with employer associations, also organized by industrial sector,
representing 80 percent of German employers. Thus, collective bargaining is
relatively centralized at the industry level. Both the unions and employers
associations are strongly positioned vis-à-vis their rank and file by virtue of the
control they exercise over a range of resources important to their members,
such as skill certification, vocational-training schemes, and strike funds.
The system is supported by a legal framework that regulates many aspects
of the bargaining process, specifies that only legally-recognized unions can
conclude collective wage-agreements, and allows industry settlements to be
extended to cover all companies in a sector by agreement between the union,
the employers association, and the regional governments. At the plant level, the
8system is underpinned by a system of elected works councils on which the
unions are generally represented., Works councils which can negotiate local
working conditions and, informally, local pay structures.xxx
Equally central to the operation of the system is the less-formal
arrangement whereby the settlements of most industries follow the precedent
set by the bargain reached in a leading sector each year. For most of the
postwar period, these lead bargains have been concluded between IG Metall,
the massive metalworkers union that organizes a range of industries including
automobiles, engineering and steel, and the corresponding employers
federation, Gesamptmetall.xxxi A variety of factors converge to give IG Metall
this role and to ensure that other industries will follow its lead. Since it is the
largest and one of the strongest German unions, the others can follow its lead
knowing they would be unlikely to improve on its settlement, and the powerful
employers’ associations tend to resist increases beyond what it secures.xxxii
It is clear that these institutional arrangements constitute a system for
highly coordinated wage-bargaining and tend to promote low rates of inflation.
Since the lead bargainers in metalworking know that their settlement is likely to
be generalized to the whole economy, IG Metall need not seek an additional
increment to guard against unanticipated levels of inflation that might follow
from subsequent settlements. Both IG Metall and Gesamptmetall, have strong
incentives to take the overall economic impact of any potential settlement into
account when determining it. Thus, the system of wage bargaining itself tends
to reduce rates of inflation.
In addition, the German system also features a particular kind of interaction
between wage bargainers and the central bank. The highly public pas de deux
between the Bundesbank and the principal wage bargainers, which occurs at
the time of every annual wage round in Germany, is a prominent feature of
politics there. The bank often issues pointed comments on the wage demands
of the unions, accompanied by detailed commentary on the state of the
economy and warnings about the likely monetary-policy consequences of
overly-inflationary wage settlements. Because bargaining is relatively
centralized, the principal negotiators are not left in much doubt about whether
the bank intends to respond to their particular settlement; and it is not
uncommon for them to issue counter-statements about the likely effect of their
demands on the state of the economy.xxxiii
In short, the coordination of German wage-bargaining helps to make the
process of signaling that takes place between the central bank and wage
bargainers highly effective. The system does not work perfectly: occasionally,
wage bargainers defy the bank, whether to test its resolve or to satisfy their
rank and file; but, over the long run, they have paid careful attention to its
pronouncements. As a result, the Bundesbank has often been able to use this
signaling mechanism to induce more moderate wage settlements, limiting the
extent to which it has had to rely on real monetary constriction.
9Two other factors also enhance the effectiveness of the signaling process
in Germany. First, the independence of the central bank increases the
credibility of its pronouncements, which in turn helps to ensure that subsequent
industry settlements do not exceed the lead bargain. This suggests that there
may be a reciprocal effect between central bank independence and wage
coordination, whereby each augments the impact of the other, especially when
bargaining is coordinated at the industry level.xxxiv Second, the effectiveness of
the signaling mechanism may also be enhanced by the fact that a sector with
high export concentration, metalworking, negotiates the lead bargain in most
years. Wage bargainers in export sectors tend to favor lower settlements
because they are concerned to maintain unit labor costs at internationally-
competitive levels. However, they are also especially sensitive to signals from
the central bank because the restrictive monetary policies that the bank wields
tend not only to depress general economic activity but also to appreciate the
exchange rate, thereby threatening the level of economic activity in export
sectors especially severely.xxxv
In sum, there are good reasons to believe that the capacity of postwar
Germany to secure low rates of inflation at low rates of unemployment cannot
be attributed solely to the independence of the Bundesbank but derives,
instead, from that presence of an effective signaling process that is based on
the combination of central bank independence and coordinated wage-
bargaining.
V. A Cross-National Analysis
We turn now to cross-national empirical investigation of the propositions
advanced here. As noted above, one of the most important bases for
contemporary enthusiasm about central bank independence is a set of simple
yet influential empirical studies which, using postwar-average cross-sections,
conclude that a nation can reduce its rate of inflation without any adverse real
economic consequences simply by increasing the independence of its central
bank. One such article concludes that “having an independent central bank is
almost like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in
terms of macroeconomic performance.”xxxvi
However, most of these studies suffer from a serious flaw. In keeping with
neoclassical models that portray the economy as largely institutionally-
homogenous across nations, the only institutional variable included in them is
one reflecting the degree of independence of the central bank.xxxvii Here, we
propose including a further institutional variable, representing the degree to
which wage bargaining is coordinated. Once it is brought into the analysis, two
new possibilities arise. We may find that the independence of the central bank
is only partially responsible for the effects hitherto attributed to it and/or we may
find that the precise impact of increasing the independence of the central bank
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depends on the configuration of other institutions in the political economy. The
analysis presented in the preceding section suggests three specific hypotheses.
First, nothing in our account contradicts the proposition that an increase in
the independence of the central bank will lower the rate of inflation experienced
by a nation. Thus, we expect to see a negative relationship between central
bank independence and the rate of inflation in cross-national data.
Second, we expect the level of wage coordination to have an effect on the
rate of inflation independent from the effects of central bank independence.
This follows from the argument that, where wage bargaining is more
coordinated, individual bargaining units will face more institutional incentives to
avoid inflationary wage settlements.
Third, our theoretical perspective leads us to expect interaction effects
between the level of central bank independence and the level of wage
coordination with respect (especially) to the rate of unemployment. In nations
where wage bargaining is coordinated, increasing the independence of the
central bank may reduce the rate of inflation without adverse real economic
consequences because the signaling system connecting the central bank to
economic actors should be highly efficient there. In nations where wage
bargaining is less coordinated, however, we expect to find that increasing the
independence of the central bank lowers the rate of inflation only at the cost of
substantially higher rates of unemployment because the signaling mechanisms
there are not efficient enough to allow the bank to reduce the rate of inflation
without actually implementing restrictive real monetary policies that increase
unemployment. Thus we expect the unemployment cost of central bank
independence to increase as the coordination of wage bargaining decreases.
The corollary is that the unemployment benefit of coordinateding wage
bargaining should increase with the independence of the central bank.xxxviii
In order to test these hypotheses, we have assembled a data set data
covering all the OECD nations for which comparable data could be secured for
the period from 1955 to 1990.xxxix To measure central bank independence, we
use an average of the five most commonly used indices, which assess both the
legal status of the central bank and its reputation for independence.xl To
measure the degree to which wage bargaining is coordinated across the
economy, we construct an index based on the one devised by Soskice,
extrapolated to a wider range of cases using the assessments Layard et al.
make of trade-union and employer coordination and standard accounts of
industrial-relations systems.xli This index codes each nation at one of five points
(0, .25, .50, .75, 1.0) based on the degree to which wage bargaining has been
coordinated by trade unions and/or employer associations over the course of
the 1955-1990 period.
The studies from which the central bank independence literature has drawn
its empirical support have been cross-sectional analyses of the average
postwar experience of the developed democracies. Accordingly, in order to
ensure comparability with such analyses, we adopt the same approach in the
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first part of this investigation. Although this obviously limits the degrees of
freedom, we think the argument underlying the approach—namely that
postwar-average cross-sections are especially appropriate for assessing
durable relationships between economic outcomes and structural variables that
exhibit little or no temporal variation over the time-period studied—has
considerable merit in this case, since the independence of the central bank and
the coordination of wage bargaining are clearly such variables.xlii  The premise
is that the effects of such variables show up most clearly when assessed over a
long period of time and that greater confidence can be placed in any
relationships if they persist over a wide variety of economic contexts, extending
from the years of postwar growth when inflation and unemployment were
generally low, through the high-inflation period of the 1970s, to the high
unemployment decade of the 1980s. Still, to the degree that cross-temporal
variation which can be usefully measured and modeled exists, disaggregating
the data may improve the empirical analysis. AccordinglyHowever, wein order
to supplement the extend previous enquiry with an analysis that provides
additional degrees of freedom, we also utilize by considering decade-frequency
and annual data as well.xliiiworthwhile subjecting the hypotheses to this
additional test.
We begin with some simple cross-tabulations that display the broad
patterns in the data. Table One reports the rates of GDP-deflator inflation and
(internationally comparable) unemployment as well as the Okun misery index
that sums the two to reflect the overall level of “economic misery” for nations
that feature different levels of central bank independence and wage-bargaining
coordination. It is apparent that countries with more independent central banks
tend to have lower rates of inflation, as conventional analyses of central bank
independence predict. In addition, as our second hypothesis predicts,
increasing the level of coordination in the wage bargaining system also seems
to reduce the rate of inflation, although some exceptions exist.
Finally, looking at the movement from a low to a medium level of central
bank independence, for example, we can see that increasing the independence
of the central bank has smallernegative effects on unemployment where wage
bargaining is more coordinated. At low levels of wage coordination, this
increase in independence is associated with a rise in the average rate of
unemployment of 1.7 percent (from 4.7 to 6.4). At medium levels of wage
coordination, however, a similar move increases unemployment by 1.1 percent
(from 3.5 to 4.6), and at high levels of wage coordination by only 0.2 percent
(from 2.0 to 2.2). This is consistent with our third contention that increasing the
coordination of wage bargaining improves the signaling and coordination
mechanism between the central bank and wage bargainers, thereby making it
possible for a nation to secure roughly equivalent levels of inflation at lower
levels of unemployment.
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Table One: Postwar-Average Inflation and Unemployment Rates under the
Various Institutional Arrangements of the OECD Countries, 1955-90
Central Bank
Independence
Coordination of
Wage Bargaining
Average
Inflation
Average
Unemployment
Misery
Index
LOW LOW (6 countries) 7.5 4.7 12.2
MEDIUM (3 countries) 5.5 3.5  9.0
HIGH (2 countries) 6.3 2.0 8.3
MEDIUM LOW (1 country) 5.1 6.4 11.5
MEDIUM (2 countries) 5.8 4.6 10.5
HIGH (1 country) 4.4 2.2  6.6
HIGH LOW (1 country) 4.4 5.8 10.2
MEDIUM (2 countries) 3.9 2.0  5.9
HIGH (0 countries) --- --- ---
Notes: Inflation and unemployment rates are in percentages. The Okun misery index is the sum
of the inflation and unemployment rates. For the purposes of this table, cases were coded as
follows. CWB: low = 0 and 0.25, medium = 0.5 and 0.75, high = 1; CBI: low = below 0.5, medium
= 0.5 to 0.75, high = 0.75 and above.  For sources and detailed data see the notes and Data
Appendix.
Such effects can be seen even more clearly in Table Two where we divide
the OECD nations differently, this time according to whether they have a low or
high level of central bank independence and a low or high level of wage
coordination. The results are striking. In all cases, an increase in the level of
central bank independence is associated with a substantial drop in the level of
inflation. An increase in the coordination of wage bargaining also produces a
decline in the level of inflation, albeit less substantial and only when central
bank independence is low. However, the effects on unemployment of
increasing the level of central bank independence vary according to the degree
to which wage bargaining is coordinated. In nations where wage coordination is
high, an increase in the independence of the central bank is associated with a
very small increase in the rate of unemployment (0.5 points). Where wage
coordination is low, however, an increase in the independence of the central
bank is associated with a substantial increase in the rate of unemployment (1.4
points—or nearly three times as much).
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Table Two: Average Inflation and Unemployment Rates Secured in
OECD
Countries under Alternative Institutional Arrangements, 1955-90
 INFLATION RATES  UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Coord-
Central Bank
Independence Coord-
Central Bank Independence
inated LOW HIGH inated LOW HIGH
Wage LOW 7.5 (6) 4.8 (2) Wage LOW 4.7 (6) 6.1 (2)
Barg. HIGH 6.2 (4) 4.8 (4) Barg. HIGH 2.3 (4) 2.8 (4)
Notes: Cases were coded as follows: CWB: low = 0 and 0.25, high = 0.75 and 1; CBI: low =
below 0.50, high = above 0.50. Cases where CWB = medium (0.5) are omitted here. The
number of countries in each category is given in parentheses after the postwar-average inflation
or unemployment.
In order to provide more complete tests of these hypotheses, we turn now
to regression analysis which can assess the effects of the institutional variables
(CBI and CWB) while controlling for a number of other economic and political
variables that might be expected to influence the level of inflation or
unemployment. In these regressions we control for: (a) the economic openness
of the economy, on the premise that more open economies may experience
greater pressure to moderate the level of inflation and more (less)
unemployment induced by adverse (favorable) fluctuations in the international
economy, (b) the natural log of the level of real per-capita gross domestic
product, on the premise that less-developed nations may be more tempted to
rely on seignorage for revenue and more susceptible to high levels of
unemployment; (c) the representation of left parties in the cabinet to reflect the
widely-accepted view that social democratic governments are more likely to
tolerate inflation and less likely to tolerate unemployment than their
conservative counterparts; and (d) union density (percent of the labor force
unionized) on the premise that, ceteris paribus, greater unionization (controlling
for coordination) produces less wage restraint and therefore more inflation and
unemployment.xliv
The basic format of the regressions to be reported here are:
p a b b b e
a b b b e
p
p p p p p
= + + + × +
= + + + × +
C CBI CWB CBI CWB
U C CBI CWB CBI CWB
cbi cwb cc
u
u
cbi
u
cwb
u
cc
u u
'
'
where p
p
 is inflation and U is unemployment, C is a vector of controls (as
mentioned above and including a constant), a
a
 is a vector of coefficients on
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those controls, and CWB and CBI are our measures of coordinated wage-
bargaining and central bank independence respectively. Our primary
hypotheses, as stated above, are three. First, central bank independence
generally reduces inflation: ¶ p ¶ b bp p/ CBI CWBcbi cc” + < 0 . Second, coordination
of wage bargaining also generally decreases inflation:
¶ p ¶ b b
p p/ CWB CBIcwb cc” + < 0 . Third, and most centrally, coordination of wage
bargaining reduces the unemployment cost of central bank independence:
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ b( / ) /U CBI CWB ccu” < 0 . The view developed here also leads us to expect
three ancillary results. Fourth, we expect, not at all originally, that coordination
of wage bargaining generally lowers unemployment, implying:
¶ ¶ b bU CWB CBIcwb
u
cc
u/ ” + < 0 . Fifth, because we have argued that central bank
independence has unemployment costs when coordination of wage bargaining
is low, this implies that, at least for low values of CWB,
¶ ¶ b bU CBI CWBcbi
u
cc
u/ ” +  is positive, which in turn means that b cbiu  must be
sufficiently positive given that b ccu  is expected to be negative. Sixth, our
discussion suggests that central bank independence and coordination of wage
bargaining may interact in determining inflation as well as unemployment.
Accordingly, b pcc  may not be zero, but we do not have strong priors on its sign or
magnitude.
In the data analysis that follows, we report, first, results from postwar-
average data which regress 1955-90 averages of inflation and unemployment
each on a constant, and the 1955-90 averages of the independent variables.
The equation is estimated by using OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent variance-covariance matrices.
Second, we estimate regressions with decade-frequencylevel data and
dummy variables for each decade, to allow for shared time-trends and supply
shocks, providing which provides 72 observations. Dummy variables for each
decade are included to allow for cross-nationally shared time-trends and
decade-specific supply shocks. To allow for the temporal dependence in them
observations, we incorporate an AR(1) process in the residuals.xlv The temporal
disaggregation nowgreater degress of freedom also make it possible permits us
to model the impact of international economic conditions on unemployment
more accurately by controlling for the terms of trade (ToT = export-price index
divided by import-price index) and terms of trade times trade openness (ToT
OPEN).xlvi The equations are estimated using weighted least squares and
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix.xlvii
Finally, although we consider the post-war average and decade-level
analyses most appropriate here given the temporal invariance of our key
structural variables, for the purposes of comparison, we also report regressions
employing annual-frequency data. Thiswhich allows us to use thefor annual
variation present in all but the institutional variables., using a Annual dummies
are added to treat the data set as a pooling of cross-sections rather than as a
pooling of time-series, increasing comparability of the estimates with those
obtained from the other two levels of analysis. We estimate these equations by
OLS as “pseudo-error-correction” models with Beck-Katz panel-corrected
covariance (PCSE) matrices.xlviii
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The results for all three sets of regressions are reported in Table Three.
They exhibit remarkable stability across the various units of temporal
aggregation and, together, provide strong confirmation for most of our
hypotheses. In all models, the level of central bank independence and the level
of wage coordination both have a negative and statistically-significant
relationship to the rate of inflation over the 1955-90 period (our first and second
hypotheses).xlix Taking the decade-level data as a base for estimates, if Belgium
or the Netherlands (CWB=0.5), for instance, had increased CBI by 0.3 points
(an increase roughly equivalent to the distance between the Bank of England
and the U.S. Federal Reserve), we estimate that they could have reduced their
rate of inflation by about 1.16 percentage points. Conversely, if Denmark or
Finland (CBI » .5) had increased CWB by .25 points (to the level of Norway or
Sweden), we estimate they could have reduced their inflation rate by about 0.44
points.
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Table Three: Parameter Estimates for Our Models of
Inflation and Unemployment in OECD Countries from 1955-90
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Inflation Rates Unemployment Rates
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES avg. Dec. ann.l avg. dec. ann.50
Real GDP per Capita (RGDPC)
(in natural logs)
–2.1
(1.5).19
–1.3
(0.8).11
–2.6
(1.1).02
–4.9
(1.4).01
–3.5
(0.5).00
–3.1
(1.3).01
Trade Openness (OPEN)
((exports+imports)/GDP)
–1.8
(1.4).23
–2.1
(1.1).06
–1.2
(1.0).24
+2.0
(1.0).06
+19.5
(6.9).01
+28.9
(13).02
Terms of Trade (ToT)
(Export Prices / Import Prices)
----------
------
----------
------
----------
------
----------
------
+4.3
(2.1).04
+8.0
(4.7).09
Interaction Term
(ToT x OPEN)
----------
------
----------
------
----------
------
----------
------
–14.6
(6.4).03
–24.9
(12).04
Left Cabinet Participation (LCAB)
(left party percent of cabinet seats)
+1.87
(2.7).51
–1.4
(0.7).05
+0.8
(0.8).30
+2.3
(1.4).12
+1.4
(0.6).02
+1.0
(0.8).21
Union Density (UDEN)
(percent of labor force unionized)
+3.2
(2.8).28
+6.6
(1.8).00
+4.5
(2.0).02
+0.9
(3.1).79
+1.1
(1.8).54
+2.2
(2.2).31
Degree of Central Bank
Independence (CBI)
–4.2
(1.7).03
–6.2
(2.1).00
–3.9
(2.8).17
+11.5
(2.8).00
+9.7
(1.9).00
+8.3
(4.2).05
Degree of Coordination in
Wage Bargaining (CWB)
–4.6
(2.3).07
–4.1
(1.6).01
–4.4
(2.6).09
+1.0
(1.5).53
–1.4
(1.5).37
–1.6
(2.0).43
Interaction Term
(CBI x CWB)
+3.2
(2.7).25
+4.7
(2.8).10
+3.3
(3.8).39
–13.1
(3.3).00
–10.8
(2.5).00
–9.3
(4.7).05
Number of Observations
(Degrees of Freedom)
18
(10)
72
(60)
612
(566)
18
(10)
72
(58)
612
(562)
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.73 0.31 0.81 0.86 0.40
Standard Error of the Regression 1.06 1.76 2.31 0.90 1.21 0.59
Durbin-Watson Statistic ------ 2.25 1.96 ------ 1.65 1.94
Notes: Estimated long-run effects in bold, the standard error of those estimates in parentheses
below that, and the p-level from the two-sided t-test that these long-run effects are zero is
superscripted to the standard error. All other estimates omitted to conserve space; complete
results available upon request.li The dependent variables are in percentage units; all
independent variables potentially vary from 0-1 except ToT and LRGDPC (see Data Appendix
for detailed summary statistics).
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Similarly, our third, and most important hypothesis—namely that the
unemployment costs of increasing central bank independence are not zero but
rather depend (negatively) on the degree of coordination of wage bargaining—
receives very strong support here. The coefficients on the interaction term for
CBIxCWB are negative, of substantial magnitude, and statistically significant in
all three equations (p » .0001 in the “decade” equation, p » .0025 in the postwar-
average equation, and p » .047 in the annual equation).lii
Although not a less central hypothesis from this analysis, one further
implication of these regressions should be noted. They suggest that there is a
tendency for increases in central bank independence to raise the level of
unemployment in at least some settings.liii We interpret this as to be the result
of the ‘conservatism’ effect noted above; namely, more independent central
banks may give more weight to securing low inflation over securing low
unemployment than more dependent banks. As Table Four suggests, however,
these effects are likely to be more pronounced in settings where wage
bargaining is relatively uncoordinated. Where it is highly coordinated, we have
argued that an increase in central bank independence may actually help to
lower unemployment by reinforcing the process of wage coordination,
alandthough these figures provide someonly weak  confirmationsupport for that
contention. In general, Table Four, which reports the estimated long-run impact
of a unit increase in central bank independence in settings that vary according
to the level of wage coordination, shows that central bank independence tends
to lower the rate of inflation in all settings but has the greatest effects where
wage coordination is too low to have an impact of its own on inflation.
Conversely, central bank independence tends to increase the rate of
unemployment, but this cost diminishes as coordination increases, perhaps
even becoming a benefit at very high coordination.
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Table Four: The Estimated Impact of a Unit Increase in Central Bank Independence
at Various Degrees of Coordination in the Wage-Bargaining System
Conditional Parameter Estimates for Effect of
Unit Increase in Central Bank Independence on...
Level of Wage- Inflation Rates Unemployment Rates
Bargaining
Coordination avg. dec. ann. avg. dec. ann.
 0.00 (US, UK, Ireland) –4.6(2.3).07
–6.2
(2.1).00
–3.9
(2.8).17
+12
(2.8).00
+9.7
(1.9).00
+8.3
(4.2).05
 0.25 (France, Italy,
New Zealand)
–3.8
(1.8).063
–5.0
(1.6).00
–3.1
(2.0).0613
+8.3
(2.0).00
+7.0
(1.4).00
+6.0
(3.1).052
 0.50 (Belgium,
Netherlands)
–3.0
(1.5).074
–3.9
(1.3).00
–2.3
(1.4).105
+5.0
(1.4).010
+4.3
(1.0).00
+3.7
(2.1).084
 0.75 (Japan, Germany,
Denmark, Finland,
Switzerland)
–2.2
(1.5).1608
–2.7
(1.3).042
–1.5
(1.2).124
+1.7
(1.2).1086
+1.6
(0.9).105
+1.4
(1.5).1735
 1.00(Austria, Norway,
Sweden)
–1.4
(1.7).4221
–1.5
(1.6).3518
–0.6
(1.7).7135
–1.5
(1.4).2915
–1.2
(1.2).1836
–1.0
(1.6).5427
Notes: Estimated long-run effect of a unit increase in CBI at that level of CWB in bold;
conditional standard-errors at that level of CWB in parentheses; p-level of onetwo-sided t-test at
that point superscripted in italics.
Finally, the general patterns in these results can be seen in Table Five,
which reports the estimated rates of inflation and unemployment (according to
the decade-level equations of Table Three) that can be expected to occur at
different levels of central bank independence and wage coordination and at the
sample means of the other variables. The first columns in the table indicate
that, when wage bargaining is entirely uncoordinated, a 0.25 increase in central
bank independence (about the gap from the DanishDenmark to the US bank or
from the Austrian to Germany) reduces the rate of inflation by about 1.5 points
but at the cost of increasing the rate of unemployment by about 2.4 points. By
contrast, where wage bargaining is more coordinated, as the last two columns
indicate, a similar increase in the independence of the central bank brings
smaller reductions in the rate of inflation but without such large increases in the
rate of unemployment.
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Table Five: Estimated Inflation and Unemployment Rates at Different Levels
of Central Bank Independence and Wage Coordination
(at means of other variables, using the “decade” equations)
Level of Coordinated Wage-Bargaining
0.00 0.50 1.00
Central Bank
Independence Infl Unem Infl Unem Infl Unem
0.00 10.04 2.50 8.01 1.83 5.97 1.15
0.25 8.50 4.92 7.04 2.89 5.59 0.86
0.50 6.95 7.33 6.08 3.95 5.21 0.58
0.75 5.40 9.75 5.11 5.02 4.83 0.29
1.00 3.85 12.16 4.15 6.08 4.45 0.00
We interpret the findings reported in Tables Three through Five as follows.
Starting from some level of central bank independence and some level of wage
coordination, an increase in the coordination of wage-bargaining improves the
signaling process thereby providing the central bank with the opportunity to get
a lower unemployment rate at the same rate of inflation, or to secure a lower
inflation rate at the same unemployment rate, or to obtain some intermediate
combination of these outcomes (and it appears that, in practice, the banks tend
to take a little of both). In short, increases in the coordination of wage
bargaining expand the “possibility frontier” in unemployment-inflation space for
the better. This implies that increases in coordinated wage-bargaining are
generally “Pareto-improving”.liv
Similarly, when wage bargaining is highly coordinated, so that the
bargainers have the incentive and capacity to respond effectively to signals
from the central bank, an increase in the independence of the bank is also
Pareto-improving because, by rendering those signals more credible, it can
reduce the rate of inflation without increases in unemployment. However, when
wage bargaining is uncoordinated, increasing the independence of the central
bank is not Pareto-improving because, although it lowers the rate of inflation, it
does so only at some unemployment cost becausesince the bargainers lack the
incentive and capacity to respond effectively to signals from the bank however
credible they may be.
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VI. The Implications for Comparative Political Economy
These findings have important implications for our understanding of the political
economy. First, they lend strong support to the contention that economic
performance is deeply affected by the institutional organization of the political
economy and cannot be explained well without reference to variation in it.
Second, this analysis speaks to the problem of how coordination may be
secured in the economy. Many neoclassical analyses assume that the behavior
of economic actors will be coordinated almost exclusively by competitive market
mechanisms and that non-market organizations should be seen primarily as
factors that interfere with effective coordination. However, by focusing on the
signaling mechanisms that link central banks to bargaining units and the latter
to each other, we have argued that non-market organizations can make a
significant contribution to the effective coordination of behavior and thus to
economic performance. Our analysis suggests that approaches to economic
problems that posit highly competitive markets and assume they will generate
cooperative outcomes are empirically fragile at best. Instead, more attention
should be paid to the way in which diverse sets of institutional arrangements
resolve the coordination problems of the economy and, in particular, to the
kinds of interaction effects that occur among them.lv
More specifically, we challenge the influential claim that, by increasing the
independence of its central bank, a nation can improve its rate of inflation
without any other adverse economic effects. Once the character of the wage-
bargaining system is incorporated into the analysis, we find that this proposition
holds only for nations with coordinated wage-bargaining systems. Where wage
bargaining is not coordinated, increasing the independence of the central bank
lowers the rate of inflation only at the cost of significant increases in
unemployment. We arrive atIn support of this conclusion by, we provide a
theoretical rationale considering the signaling process between bank and
economy more closely, and we support it with a close inspection of the critical
German case, and results from an analysis of cross-national data at three
levels of temporal aggregation.
These findings have important implications for national policy-makers. In
particular, they suggest that enhancing the independence of the central bank
may not be the economic panacea that many believe it to be. Independence of
the bank may provide the full gains it promises only when it is combined with
coordinated wage-bargaining.lvi But, unlike central bank independence, which
can be legislated relatively easily, wage coordination is difficult to secure and
substantially beyond the control of government policy. A nation’s capacity for
wage coordination depends on the character of a variety of societal
organizations, such as trade unions and employer confederations, which
emerge out of a long historical process and may not be highly amenable to
political engineering.lvii Thus, many governments that enhance the
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independence of their central bank may find the results somewhat
disappointing.
VII. The Implications for European Monetary Union
Finally, this analysis has especially interesting implications for the monetary
union that Europe is currently contemplating. EMU is to be built around a
European central bank whose general structure and level of independence are
modeled on the German Bundesbank. Many hope that, as a consequence, the
new union will emulate the historic performance of the German system.
Our analysis suggests that such aspirations are unlikely to be realized,
because German levels of performance have depended on levels of wage
coordination that the European Union is unlikely ever to acquire. On the one
hand, its leaders have yet to show any real interest in acquiring such
institutions, as the halting nature of the steps toward a Social Charter
indicates.lviii On the other, even if they did so, such institutions would be difficult
to secure. Wide disparities in the organization of workers and employers across
the EU mean that wage bargaining could not be coordinated across the
continent without large-scale reorganization; and the few efforts made by trade
unions or employers to reorganize wage bargaining on a European level have
been singularly unsuccessful.lix As a result, in order to secure low rates of
inflation, a European central bank may have to resort to relatively high levels of
unemployment because it will lack the effective signaling process provided by a
continent-wide system of wage coordination.lx
More important yet, the common view that all nations will gain from
European monetary union may be wrong.lxi Our analysis suggests that the
move to EMU may improve the economic performance of some nations relative
to their past experience but is likely to erode the economic performance of
others. The precise effects experienced by each will be determined by the
effectiveness of its existing institutions relative to those it acquires by virtue of
joining the monetary union.
Table Six: National Economic Well-Being under Different Institutional Arrangements
Assessed by the Inflation Rate, the Unemployment Rate, and Okun Misery Index, 1955-90
Level of Central Bank Independence
LOW HIGH
Degree of Coordination
LOW
 I. MI: 12.2
p p: 7.5
UE: 4.7
 II. MI: 10.9
p p: 4.8
UE: 6.1
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in Wage Bargaining
HIGH
 III. MI: 8.9
pp : 6.2
UE: 2.3
 IV. MI: 7.6
pp : 4.8
UE: 2.8
Notes: MI = Misery Index, p p = Inflation Rate (%), UE = Unemployment Rate (%). See note to
Table Two for coding of CBI and CWB.
Some sense of these effects can be gleaned from Table Six, which reports
the average postwar performance of nations possessing different combinations
of institutions. Although realized performance under EMU will differ from these
historical levels, the table does suggest how performance under the institutional
conditions it provides is likely to compare relative to the performance that can
be secured under the different institutional conditions found in its member
states.lxii EMU will create an economic unit characterized by a highly
independent central bank and uncoordinated wage-bargaining. That is the
situation represented by quadrant II in Table Six whose figures display the
average historical performance of OECD nations with that mix of institutions.
Whether a nation will gain or lose over the long run from EMU, in terms of both
inflation and unemployment, will depend on the quadrant of the table from
which it is moving. Nations that have long had relatively dependent central
banks and uncoordinated bargaining systems, such as Britain, Ireland and
France (in quadrant I), may gain slightly, at least in terms of the Okun misery
index, by virtue of acquiring a more independent central bank. Although they
are not included in our empirical analysis, Greece, Portugal and Spain probably
also fall into this category. However, if they expect to replicate Germany’s
historic levels of performance, even these countries may be disappointed
because they are moving to quadrant II rather than to quadrant IV.
By contrast, the table suggests that virtually all other member states in the
EU may experience a deterioration in economic performance as a result of the
move to monetary union because they are shifting from the institutional
conditions of quadrants III or IV to those of quadrant II. Ironically, one of the
biggest losers from this perspective will be Germany, a prime mover behind the
establishment of EMU. It has long benefited from the smooth interaction
between its independent central bank and its coordinated wage-bargaining
system. But this interaction will be disrupted because the Bundesbank will be
replaced by a European central bank that faces a wide range of
organizationally-disparate and uncoordinated wage bargaining units. It cannot
be expected to respond directly to German bargainers any more than to French
or Dutch bargainerslxiii. Indeed, most nations that once had a coordinated wage-
bargaining system will suffer because they will become part of a common
currency area with a multiplicity of uncoordinated bargaining units. In the
German case, Table Six suggests a relative deterioration in economic
performance equivalent to the movement from an Okun score of about 7 to one
that is closer to 11. Thus, the move to EMU may not be an unmitigated
blessing: its effects on economic performance willshould be distributed
unevenly across countries.
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Aside from such cross-national effects, the establishment of EMU may also
have significant distributive consequences across the different social groups
inside each nation. It is well-established that changes in rates of inflation and
unemployment have more adverse effects on some groups than on others.
Although it is difficult to identify all such effects with precision, lower-skilled
manual and clerical workers tend to suffer disproportionately from rising rates of
unemployment.lxiv In this context, it is important that, even when the move to
EMU improves the aggregate economic performance of a nation as measured
by the Okun index, it may shift the mixture of inflation and unemployment
experienced there. Even those nations in quadrant I that should gain the most
from entry can expect to experience higher levels of unemployment as a result.
Indeed, from an institutional perspective, there is reason to expect EMU to
conduce toward rates of unemployment higher than those that most of its
member nations have historically enjoyed, either because the new European
central bank will be more independent than their own has been (and thus more
likely to privilege inflation over unemployment) or because it will seek rates of
inflation commensurate with past experience but without the efficient signaling
mechanism provided by systems of coordinated wage bargaining. This
suggests that those at the margins of the labor market may bear the greatest
costs associated with the creation of European monetary union.
Of course, we emphasize that one must treat these inferences with caution.
EMU may have other economic effects not modeled here that could offset
some of the distributive consequences on which we focus; and, because the
figures in Table Six are based on historical levels of performance, the actual
levels of economic performance that will realize in the EU may diverge from
them for a wide variety of reasons. However, thise theory and evidence
provided here suggest that, even if the precise outcomes diverge from those
estimated here, European monetary union should have more uneven
distributive effects within and across countries than is conventionally
acknowledged.
To return finally to the German case, it may be that the better guide to what
we can expect from EMU is not the familiar image of Modell Deutschland but
the experience that Germany had with unification in the years just after 1989.
After all, the creation of a European monetary union is analogous in some
respects to the process of German unification. High-wage and highly-skilled
economies will be joined to less-developed regions under a single monetary
authority. That authority will have to cope with a greater variety of economic
shocks than did its national predecessors. New modalities for wage bargaining
and fiscal coordination across the disparate regions of the union will have to be
developed; and the various kinds of economic integration that should follow
from monetary integration may generate substantial economic dislocation, as
they did in Germany, albeit to a lesser degree.
In this context, the lessons that follow from the example of German
unification are not altogether encouraging. The German system itself
experienced severe strain as a result of unification. Two sources of strain
deserve emphasis here. First, efforts to incorporate East Germany into the
existing industrial relations system proved highly taxing and only partly
successful. One result was high levels of industrial conflict, notably in the
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spring of 1993 when employers challenged the extension of the wage-
bargaining system to the East.lxv Second, unification also provoked conflict
between the federal government and the Bundesbank, which customarily
responds not only to wage bargains, as we have emphasized here, but also to
the fiscal policies of the government. When the efforts of the latter to finance
unification resulted in fiscal and monetary expansion, the Bundesbank
responded with high interest rates to encourage fiscal restraint and dampen
inflationary pressures. The consequences were far from ideal for the German or
European economies.
European monetary union will pose similar, if less severe, challenges. It will
disrupt the processes of signaling and coordination long-established between
central banks and wage bargainers in some nations, which may inspire broader
changes in their industrial relations systems. It will require the development of
new relationships between the European central bank and the fiscal authorities
of each nation, which have already been the subject of considerable
controversy.lxvi Moreover, in the context of continuing high unemployment,
many member governments may seek more expansionary policies precisely
when the new European central bank is seeking to establish its credibility with
relatively-rigorous monetary policies. One effect is likely to be higher levels of
unemployment than many proponents of European monetary union currently
envisage.lxvii Another may be intensified pressure for further institution building
to cope with the dilemmas of coordinating fiscal and monetary policy.
The larger point here is that the creation of a European monetary union will
generate a variety of new coordination problems that will not automatically be
solved by the presence of a relatively independent central bank. The principal
argument of this paper is that the resolution of such problems depends on the
development of a larger system of institutional arrangements. An independent
central bank trying to impose its will on a reluctant government or recalcitrant
workforce may be only a second-best  second-besolution solution solution to
problems that could be tackled more effectively through a broader range of
institutions. In this respect, the creation of a European Monetary Union is likely
to be only the first step in a more extensive process of institution -building,
bearing on both the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy at the European
level and the character of collective bargaining within its member states.lxviii It is
on this wider process that the success of European Monetary Union will
ultimately depend.
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Data Appendix
We list here summary statistics for the data and all the data necessary to
replicate the postwar-average results presented in the text. Data analysis
conducted in Econometric Views 2.0; Stata 5.0; and Gauss-386i v. 3.01. All of
the data are available from [author’s homepage address withheld].
COUNTRY MI UE p CBI CWB GDP Open Uden Lcab
United States 10.17 5.76 4.41 0.75 0.00 9.43 0.11 0.24 0.00
Japan 6.34 1.97 4.42 0.41 0.75 8.49 0.20 0.32 0.00
Germany 6.80 3.13 3.68 0.93 0.75 8.92 0.39 0.34 0.29
France 10.79 4.16 6.63 0.43 0.25 8.91 0.29 0.18 0.17
Italy 14.19 5.576 8.62 0.37 0.25 8.72 0.30 0.34 0.18
U. K. 12.25 4.88 7.37 0.42 0.00 8.95 0.37 0.43 0.33
Canada 11.49 6.43 5.06 0.61 0.00 9.25 0.39 0.30 0.00
Austria 6.57 2.18 4.39 0.65 1.00 8.71 0.46 0.55 0.65
Belgium 9.94 5.48 4.46 0.41 0.50 8.88 0.95 0.48 0.24
Denmark 11.51 4.85 6.65 0.53 0.75 8.94 0.52 0.67 0.64
Finland 10.75 3.10 7.66 0.49 0.75 8.78 0.43 0.54 0.39
Ireland 16.10 8.10 8.00 0.46 0.00 8.38 0.79 0.51 0.09
Netherlands 9.05 4.27 4.78 0.56 0.50 8.91 0.93 0.34 0.16
Norway 8.00 2.23 5.76 0.23 1.00 8.96 0.54 0.55 0.72
Sweden 8.46 1.73 6.73 0.30 1.00 9.03 0.45 0.73 0.85
Switzerland 5.00 0.89 4.11 0.84 0.75 9.32 0.53 0.32 0.23
Australia 10.56 3.95 6.61 0.47 0.25 9.10 0.28 0.46 0.22
New Zealand 9.22 1.34 7.88 0.14 0.25 8.97 0.43 0.58 0.27
Mean 9.96 4.01 5.96 0.50 0.49 9.15 0.46 0.44 0.31
Std. Dev. 2.88 2.038 1.578 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.24
Maximum 16.5 8.46 8.62 0.93 1.00 9.51 0.95 0.73 0.83
Minimum 4.98 0.87 3.68 0.15 0.00 8.60 0.11 18.3 0.00
Notes: MI = MIsery Index; UE = Unemployment; p=Inflation; CBI = Central Bank
Independence; CWB = Coordination of Wage Bargaining; GDP = Natural Log of Real
GDP per Capita; Open = (Exports+Imports)/GDP; Uden = Fraction of Labor Force
Unionized; Lcab = Fraction of Cabinet Seats Held by Left Parties. See footnotes in the
text for sources.
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NOTES :
                                                          
i. See, e.g., European Commission 1990. For more general discussion of advantages and
disadvantages, see: Eichengreen 1992; Eichengreen and Frieden 1997; and Goodhart
1995.
ii. Indeed, some European nations are enhancing the independence of their central banks
because the Maastricht Treaty requires such a step in the second stage of movement
toward EMU. See: Eichengreen 1990, 117-87; de la DeHesa et al. 1993; Gros and
Thygesen 1992; Goodhart 1995, 448-506; Fratianni, et al. 1992; and Fratianni and von
Hagen 1992, 187-88.
iii. The Financial Times 12 November 1992, 20.
iv. Many nations, such as Italy, Belgium, France, New Zealand and Sweden, have recently
made their central banks more independent and many others are considering similar
moves.
v. Here we consider only those aspects of economic performance likely to be affected by
thecentral bank independence of the proposed European Central Bank. For a more general
discussion of other factors bearing on the performance of EMU, see Eichengreen 1992,
1994.
vi. Some of the basic literature is collected in: Persson and Tabellini, eds., 1994; for the most
extensive treatment, see: Cukierman 1992.
vii. Fratianni et al. 1992; Alesina and Grilli 1993.
viii. Among the best of these is Alesina and Summers 1993. See also Grilli, et al. 1991 and
Cukierman 1992, and Eijffinger and De Haan 1996 for a review.
ix. Although some of these postulates may be contentious, we do not take issue with them
here as our own arguments hold under a variety of economic assumptions including those
of the standard neoclassical framework.
 Cf. Posen 1995a and 1995b, however.
x. See Cukierman 1992 on this argument and a variety of others that go somewhat beyond
the present discussion.
xi. See: Nordhaus 1975; Beck 1982; Alesina 1988; and, most recently, Clark, Lomas, and
Parker 1995.
xii. The classic source is Rogoff 1985, which builds on Barro and Gordon 1983 and Kydland
and Prescott 1977. See also Lohmann 1992 and Cukierman 1992.
xiii. The general presumptions are that, the more independent the central bank, the more
restrictive monetary policy is likely to be and the more credible its commitment to a given
policy announcement is likely to be.
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xiv. Eichengreen 1996.
xv. Since prices can be defined as a mark-up on wages, any wage bargaining is by definition
also bargaining over the price and profit rate as well. Henceforth, whenever we say “wage
bargaining” we mean wage cum price bargaining. For simplicity, we will not continue to
carry around both terms, but it is important to remember that it is restraint in wage cum
price bargaining that is essential and that coordination of such bargaining can come as
easily (or perhaps more easily) from the employer as from the labor side.
xvi. For two of the most complete recent treatments, see Layard, et al. 1991, esp. ch. 2, and
Calmfors 1993.
xvii. See, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992 and Alt and Shepsle 1990.
xviii. See also Hall 1994. Franzese 1994 and 1996 adds variation in the sectoral (structural)
position of the actors to this sort of analysis. Cf. Iversen 1994 and 1996, which adds
consideration of wage disparity and wage-equalization goals on the part of labor within a
somewhat different framework.
xix. The classic early references are Bruno and Sachs 1984 and Cameron 1984; See also:
Calmfors 1993; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Lange and Garrett 1985; Layard et al. 1991; and
Soskice 1990;. The other variable most often cited as important in this literature is the
partisan composition of the government, which we also include in our regression models
but, strictly speaking, it is not an institutional feature of the political economy.
xx. See: Scharpf 1988 and 1991; Thelen 1991; and Tsebelis 1990.
xxi. Thus wage bargaining can be coordinated in Japan, where the unions are company-based,
because bargaining is concentrated into a single “spring offensive” and employers can
utilize their dense network of business associations to coordinate the negotiations. See:
Soskice 1990; Swenson 1989; and Thelen 1994.
xxii. Golden 1993; Iversen 1994.
xxiii. This parallels the arguments in Olson 1965; and 1982.
xxiv. We use the term ‘conservatism effects’ to refer to the tendency of banks that are more
independent to be less tolerant of higher levels of inflation and the term ‘credibility effects’
to refer to the effects that follow from the greater credibility of a more independent central
bank’s commitment to announced policy targets, as outlined above.
xxv. Lohmann 1994.
xxvi. Alesina and Grilli 1993; Eichengreen 1992, 38 ff.
xxvii. Although the focus of this analysis is on the organization of the political economy, other
factors may have contributed to Germany’s good inflation record, including the strong
growth of the economy and a more general cultural aversion to inflation born of the
experience of hyperinflation in the 1920s. We are inclined to see the latter as a minor
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 contributor to the outcome, but others accord it a more prominent role. See Hirsch and
Goldthorpe, eds., 1978; and Lindberg and Maier, eds., l985.
xxviii. For analyses that explore the German case more fully than we can here, see: Soskice
1990; Scharpf 1991; Streeck 1984a and 1984b. See also: Hall 1986, ch. 9 for an early
formulation of similar arguments.
xxix. Two smaller union confederations, the DAG and DBB, are not in a position to have
much influence on the overall outcomes, particularly the former which is very small, while
the DBB represents civil servants whose pay is set by legislation, but cf. Franzese 1994,
1996, and Garrett and Way 1995b on public-sector workers and wage bargaining.
xxx. On the importance of works councils in the overall system, see Thelen 1992; and Streeck
1984. More generally, see Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 1987, ch. 3; and Berghahn and
Karsten 1987.
xxxi. The notable exception occurred in 1974 when, ÖTV, the public-sector union, took the
lead in the negotiating round with less-than-ideal results. For a description of the events,
see Goodman 1992, 71. See also Garrett and Way 1995b, and Franzese 1994, 1996.
xxxii. See: Flanagan, et al. 1983, ch. 5; Markovits 1986; and Thelen 1991.
xxxiii. See, e.g.: Streeck 1984a and 1984b; Scharpf 1988 and 1991, ch. 7; and Berghahn and
Karsten 1987.
xxxiv. See also Iversen 1996 on this point (though the rationale there provided for this
observation differs to some extent from the present).
xxxv. See also Franzese 1994 and 1996 on this point.
xxxvi. Grilli et al. 1991, 375.
xxxvii. For notable exceptions, see Havrilesky and Granato 1993; Bleaney 1996; and
Al-Marhubi and Willett n.d. For a survey including a review of previous empirical studies,
see Eijffinger and De Haan 1996.
xxxviii. As noted above, the reasoning behind the corollary is that, by virtue of being able to
make more crediblee pronouncements, a more independent central bank can place more
pressure on the unions and firms in a coordinated bargaining system to exercise
restraintfollow the lead settlement, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the systemwage
coordination.
xxxix. These 18 cases represent all the major developed democracies from which Greece,
Spain, and Portugal are excluded because they had undemocratic regimes for substantial
portions of the period and it is difficult to compare a central bank’s “independence” from
authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes. Obviously, the credibility of any
nominal/legal degree of central bank independence ought to be discounted when the
ruling regime is authoritarian, but it is not clear by how much. Similar considerations
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 plague the coding of wage bargaining systems comparably across authoritarian and
democratic regimes.
xl. The five indices are those most commonly employed in the literature: LVAU, an unweighted
average of several legal characteristics, and QVAU, an unweighted average of survey
results for CBI, from Cukierman 1992; EC, the rating of the economic independence of the
central bank, and POL, the rating for political independence from Grilli et. al. 1991; and the
original index from Bade and Parkin 1982.
xli. Soskice 1990, 55; Layard, et al. 1991, 52; Flanagan, et al. 1983; Ferner and Hyman, eds.,
1992; Baglioni and Crouch, eds., 1990; Crouch 1993. Some scholars prefer an index based
on union organization but this violates the important observation of Soskice 1990, Swenson
1989 and others that employers associations also contribute to wage coordination. A
significant but unavoidable limitation of the data derived from Soskice 1990 and Layard et
al. 1991 is that they do not vary over time.
xlii. Alesina and Summers 1993 employ a similar approach and offer a similar defense. Close
inspection of such time-sensitive indices of central bank independence and trade-union
characteristics as do exist suggests that these variables did not shift substantially over time
and not enough to affect country rankings in the 1955-1990 period. The recent widespread
movement toward more independent central banks came after  our sample ends in 1990.
For example, and our postwar averages capture 96.6% of the country-decade variance in
Cukierman’s (1992) LVAU index (the only time-variant index available) is solely cross-
sectional (cross-country). Since time-variant measures of wage-/price-bargaining
coordination do not exist, we can look only at roughcrude proxies such as Golden and
Wallerstein’s (forthcoming) annual-level data for union confederation involvement in wage
bargaining in six high-coordination countries. Onlyur data miss the 33% of the variation in
this indextheirs that is unique to country-year., which may introduce some measurement
error and depress the significance measures for our coefficients, but v Variation in the
effective coordination of wage bargaining over this period is likely to be lower than variation
in union-confederal involvement and far lower in low-coordination countries than in these
six. Thus, 33% might serve as a very generous estimate of the upper bound on the share
of total variation of coordination in wage-/price-bargaining that is country-time unique.
xliii. Time-variant indices for the coordination of wage bargaining do not exist; central bank
independence has been measured by ‘decade’ (Cukierman’s LVAU is measured 1950-59,
1960-72, 1973-79 and 1980-89); all the rest of our data can be measured annually.
Although none of these levels of analysis is unambiguously dominant on statistical grounds,
we view the decade-level analysis as the best compromise over degrees-of-freedom, data-
limitations, and match-of-theory-to-empirical-specification considerations. We nonetheless
report the results of all three levels of analysis for comparison.
xliv. Economic openness is measured by exports plus imports as a percentage of gross
domestic product; terms of trade are measured as the export-price index divided by the
import-price index (data from the IMF International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM 6/96). The
representation of the left in the cabinet is based on data from Lane, et al. 1991 and
Woldendorp, et al. 1994 and classification ofand uses the classification of left parties as
inemployed by Swank 1989 in his data base of government partisanship. Per capita GDP is
from the Penn World Tables Mach Vversion 5.6. Unemployment and inflation are the
internationally comparable figures compiled from OECD sources by Layard, et al. 1991.
36
                                                                                                                                                                         
Union density figures are from Golden et al. 1995, who worked from Visser 1992, here
supplemented by Lane et al. 1991, Bean 1989, and Traxler 1994.
xlv. Since the first period is essentially the first postwar period, we feel comfortable assuming
that the residual from the previous decade does not have much lingering effect on the
1955-9 outcome. Accordingly, we begin the AR(1) process allowing the 1955-9 residual to
affect the 1960-72 outcome but being unaffected itself. This intuitively-sensible procedure
increases the sample size by 25% since it renders the data from 1955-9 usable. When a
more orthodox Prais-Winston AR(1) process is estimated, the results are virtually identical.
Both procedures have the limitation of assuming a constant serial-correlation parameter
which cannot be fully expected here because the adjacent data are not averages of the
same number of years. We have estimated decade-specific AR(1) parameters by Monte
Carlo simulation using the results from the annual data as estimates of the year-on-year
correlation, but this makes little difference to our estimates and no difference to our
substantive conclusions so we opt for the simpler and more familiar procedure.
xlvi. Our expectation is that domestic unemployment benefits (suffers) from positive (negative)
terms-of-trade shocks to the degree the economy is open to foreign trade. The interaction
is an efficient and substantively meaningful wayThis also allows us to control for oil boons
in Norway and the UK, for example . We do not control for the terms of trade in the inflation
equations because this is tantamount to putting the dependent variable on the right-hand
side: domestic inflation relative to foreign inflation practically defines terms-of-trade
movements.
xlvii. Following standard practice to ease endogeneityendogenity concerns, each of the
independent variables (except the CBI and CWB indices) are measured in the year prior to
the ‘decade’ start. WLS is needed because the data for the dependent variables are
averages over a different number of years (to accommodate the periodization of
Cukierman’sCukerman’s LVAU index) and so should exhibit heteroskedasticity that is
inversely proportional to the number of years in each decade. The weights are the square
roots of the number of years in each ‘decade’. White’s matrix is then appliedalso used
because the weights may not account for all the heteroskedasticity, although this does not
substantively affect the results.
xlviii. See Smith 1995 on the interpretation of annual dummies asuse of a pooleding cross-
sections in this kind of case, Beck 1991 on “pseudo-error-correction” and dynamic-model
specification, and Beck and Katz 1995 and 1996 on PCSEs. Specifically, the “pseudo-error-
correction” model here simply regresses (OLS) the change in the dependent variable on
the lagged change and the lagged level of the dependent variable (this being found to be
the dynamics), changes in the independent variables (with the exception of the institutional
variables which do not change) and the first lag of the independent variables.
xlix. Note that these are interactive models so that the estimated effect of a unit increase in
CWB or in CBI is not given by the coefficient on that variable alone but by bcwb+bccCBI
and bcbi+bccCWB respectively. The estimated standard errors of these effects, in turn,
depend on: (a) the estimated variance of bcwb (or bcbi), (b) the estimated variance of bcc,
(c) the estimated covariance of bcwb (or bcbi) with bcc, and (d) the level of CBI (or CWB)
at which the effect and its standard error are being evaluated. Accordingly, a test that the
effect of CBI on inflation is negative, say, cannot be read from the usual report of coefficient
standard errors and t-statistics but must be calculated over the range of the other variable.
In this case, the effects of CBI and CWB on inflation are negative at statistically significant
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levels (p= .01) over the entire or nearly the entire sample range of the other variable in all
three inflation sets of equations. The effects of CBI and (CWB) on unemployment are
positive and (negative), respectively, at even better levels over even more of the sample
range of the other variable in all three unemployment equations.
l. A few notes about pseudo-error-correction models are in order. Mathematically, the models
estimated here are equivalent to lagged-dependent-variable (partial-adjustment) models
with two lagged levels of the dependent variable and the current and lagged levels of the
independent variables except for real GDP per capita which enters only at a lag (to side-
step some of the endogeneity issues) and except for CBI and CWB which are not
effectively time-variant and so enter only in levels (CBI with a one-year lag just for
consistency with the rest of the variables). Since the dependent variable in these equations
is the change in inflation or unemployment, it is to be expected that R2 is lower than in the
“decade” and postwar-average models which are in levels or, for that matter, than R2
would be in the mathematically equivalent partial-adjustment model in annual levels.
Finally, the estimated long-run effects in pseudo-error-correction models are given by
(bo/|bl|) where bo is the coefficient on the lagged level of the variable in question and |bl| is
the absolute value of the coefficient on the lagged level of the dependent-variable. The
estimated standard errors of these estimated long-run effects are then calculated as
indicated in Greene 1997, 360-3. Details of the estimated short-run dynamics are available
upon request.
li. Deleting all insignificant variables from the equations (or all those with |t|<1 so as to
minimize the standard error of the regression), as is commonly done, does not change any
of our conclusions; this sort of step-unwise regression tends to overstate confidence levels
so we have avoided it.
lii We subjected these statistical estimations to a large number of sensitivity and robustness
tests, which included (i) searching for ‘influential points’ (ii) consideration of alternative
measures, and (iii) alternative estimation techniques. Potential outliers were sought using
DFbetas, Cook’s D, procedures and leveraged-to-squared -residual plots. “Robust”and
estimators which sequentially eliminated such outliers produce little substantive
differencewithout substantive effects on the findings in our core findingsthat bear on our
hypotheses. Substituting Cukierman’s LVAU for our averaged index of CBIindependence or
Soskice’s EWC and wage-pushfulness indices for our CWB index of wage coordination
produced similar findings, as did a variety of alternative estimation techniques (details
available from the authors). In general, the results reported in Table 4 appear highly robust
with the possible exception of those regarding the ancillary hypothesis six, the more
marginal statistical support for which is also evident from the table.
liii The results of the sort of calculation suggested in note 49 show that the impact of CBI on
unemployment is negative at a statistically-significant level (p=.01) for 89% of the range of
CWB in the decade data, 88% in the postwar average data, and 85% in the annual data.
liv. By Pareto improvement we mean simply that both unemployment and inflation fall (or that
one falls while the other remains unchanged). This is a simpler and less precise concept
thatn the one normally used in microeconomics, but it has intuitive appeal in this context.
lv. See, e.g.: Alvareze.g.:Alvarez, et al. 1991; Beck et al. 1993; and Soskice 1991.
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lvi. Conversely, our arguments and evidence also suggest that coordinated wage bargaining
may work better when it is combined with an independent central bank.
lvii. See Levy 1993 and Regini 1984.
lviii. Lange 1993; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; and Streeck 1995.
lix. See Streeck and Schmitter 1991 and George 1992.
lx. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that economies with more independent central
banks tend to have higher sacrifice ratios. See, e.g., Walsh 1995.
lxi. Cf. Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, EC 1989; Gros 1996, esp.
26.
lxii. Since we focus here on the economic effects of institutional context, ceteris paribus, this
analysis ignores for the time being other effects, both positive and negative, that the move
to EMU may have, such as those following from lower transaction costs or the need to
adjust to asymmetrical demand and supply-side shocks. On these and other effects, see
Eichengreen 1992 and Kenen 1995.
lxiii. As Soskice 1997 points out, in the absence of a central bank that responds directly to
them, the power of the German trade unions relative to employers is likely to be enhanced,
which may in turn produce a variety of further effects inside the German system..
lxiv. On this point there is a large literature. See, e.g., Hibbs 1977 and Wood 1994.
lxv. See: Webber 1994; Silvia 1994; and Locke and Jacoby 1995.
lxvi. At least some national governments have supported monetary union in the hope that it will
allow them to implement more expansionary policies than were possible under a European
Monetary System dominated by the Bundesbank, while others insist on greater fiscal and
monetary strictness. See: Fratianni and Von Hagen 1992, chs. 8 and 9; Gros 1996, 88 ff.;
Frieden et al. forthcoming; and Eichengreen 1992.
lxvii. The case of the United States in the early 1980s, when the government ran high deficits
while the Federal Reserve Bank pursued a tight monetary policy, suggests that significant
employment effects, lasting up to ten years, can follow from this combination. See
Krugman 1990, and on the political economy of American monetary policy more generally
Mayer 1990 and Wooley 1984, and on potential fiscal/monetary conflict under EMU, Kenen
1995, ch. 4 and Gros and Thyugesen 1992, ch. 8.
In the U.S. case, specifically, Reagan provided high deficits while Volcker kept tight money
which combination produced sharp real-exchange appreciation. That allowed foreign
competitors the “beach-head” which, even after the real exchange eventually returned, is
not relinquished. See Krugman 1990 on this dynamic. The upshot for the labor market is
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higher unemployment, at least until long-run structural adjustment can redeploy all the
displaced workers (just under ten years going by the broad pattern of US unemployment
over this period). More generally, on the political economy of US monetary policy, see, e.g.,
Mayer 1990 and Wooley 1984, on the potential fiscal/monetary struggle under EMU, see
Kenen 1995, ch. 4 and Gros and Thygesen 1992, ch.8.
lxviii. See Soskice 1997.
